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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
therefore, that she did not get the land is to say in substance that she
held it to keep it away from Vest's creditors or that she immediately
conveyed it to her daughter for the same purpose. It is to be doubted
whether she should not be estopped to relieve herself of an obligation by
the use of such a plea.
The brief of the appellee-mortgagee reveals no less than six convey-
ances made by or to Mrs. Booth within some three years' time for the
sole purpose of defrauding and hindering her own or the Vests' cred-
itors.8 In such a situation, created by the mother-in-law as well as the
Vests and participated in by the whole family, it would seem that any
doubts should be resolved in favor of the creditors.
On the court's interpretation of the facts, the result reached in the
principal case is defensible. It would not have been under other inter-
pretations. The opinion does not adequately indicate the problems
involved.
PETER HAIRSTON.
Mortgages--Fiduciary Relationship of the Parties.
The defendant operated an automobile sales agency. He borrowed
money from the plaintiff acceptance company to purchase a car, deliv-
ering to the ompany his promissory note, a mortgage upon, and a bill
of sale to, the car, and a trust receipt. That document stated that the
defendant would hold the car in storage as the property of the company
and would not dispose of it until the note was paid. While in the
defendant's display room, the car was sold without the plaintiff's con-
sent. The defendant failed to remit the purchase price; rather he
filed a petition in bankruptcy and received his discharge. The accep-
tance company had been listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Following the filing of the petition, this action for conversion
was instituted. The company contended that the defendant's acts came
within section 17(4) of the Bankruptcy Act,' which provides that dis-
charge in bankruptcy does not release liabilities created by "fraud,
embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in any...
fiduciary capacity." Judgment was rendered for the defendant.'
It may be safely stated that the line of cleavage between those who
8 Brief filed on behalf of Elizabeth E. Keiffer, Appellee, in the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia in the case of Lawhead v. Booth et al., page 8.
- 11 U. S. C. A. 35 (4) (1927).
"Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., U. S., 79 L. ed. 137, 55 Sup. Ct. 151 (1934)
(The problem of whether the defendant had wilfully and maliciously injured
the plaintiff's property within the terms of subdivision two of the same sections
was also presented. The court decided that the evidence showed a technical but
not a malicious conversion); cf. In re Burchfield, 31 F. (2d) 118 (W. D. N. Y.
1929).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
are and who are not in a "fiduciary capacity" within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Act is clear. That term applies only to expressed or'
technical trusts as contrasted to those situations where the courts imply
an obligation from the trust or confidence reposed in the debtor.2 It
is essential that the relationship exist before the debt from which the
cause of action arose was contracted.3 Thus it has been held that the
exception stated in the Act does not apply to a broker,4 a partner, 5 a
mortgagor,6 or, as in the principal case, to one who gave a trust receipt
upon a consignment of cars.7 If a debtor who has posted security to
protect his creditor is not a fiduciary within the meaning of the excep-
tion, an interesting problem arises in determining just what, if any,
is the extent of the confidential relation existing between these parties.
Where the debtor wrongfully disposes of the security, the injured
creditor has a right of action against him.3 He may even follow the
proceeds derived from the sale as long as they can be definitely identi-
fied and have not passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value.9 Though these remedies are settled, there exists some dispute
as to the theory upon which they are based. In a leading case in
Maine,10 it was said that "the Law imputes a trust in the mortgagor."
That the application of such a doctrine to the problem under discussion
is unnecessary is shown by a more recent decision from Wyoming."
There the same result was obtained by treating the mortgagor as an
agent of the mortgagee. Still other courts have held that while in using
the security in the ordinary course of business the mortgagor is no
trustee, he is under a duty to preserve that security intact.12
Correspondingly, the courts are faced with the same difficulty of
nomenclature in determining the reverse situation-the nature of a credi-
'Chapman v. Forsythe, 69 U. S. 202, 11 L. ed. 250 (1844); In re Harber,
9 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
1Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 365, 11 Sup. Ct. 313, 34 L. ed. 931 (1891);
Clair v. Colmes, 245 Mass. 281, 139 N. E. 519 (1923).
'In re Codman, 284 Fed. 273 (D. Mass. 1922).
G In re Frazzetta, 1 F. Supp. 122 (W. D. N. Y. 1932); Karger v. Orth, 116
Minn. 124, 133 N. W. 471 (1911).
' Bryant v. Kenyon, 127 Mich. 152, 86 N. W. 531 (1901). But cf. Johnson v.
Worden, 47 Vt. 457 (1874); Darling v. Woodward, 54 Vt. 101 (1881) (where a
different result was reached. However, in neither of these cases does it appear
within which specific exception to the Bankruptcy Act the defendant was
included.)
Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
8 Davis v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 229 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
' Columbia Basin Wool Warehouse Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Fairchild, 290
Fed. 260 (D. Idaho 1923) ; First Nat. Bank of Auburn v. Eastern Trust & Bank-
ing Co., 108 Me. 79, 76 Atl. 4 (1911) ; cf. Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Kingman
Texas Implement Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 343, 80 S. W. 1042 (1904) (where the
question of what constitutes identification is discussed).
10 McLarren v. Brewer, 51 Me. 402 (1863).
" Thex v. Shreve, 38 Wyo. 285, 267 Pac. 92 (1928).
" Da-is v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 229 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
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tor's duty toward his debtor. Here, however, a greater number of cases
have arisen than in the above situation; thus one has the benefit of the
added judicial expression. Roughly the decisions may be divided into
two classes: Those that arise in states which treat the mortgagee as
having a mere lien upon the debtor's property; and those which hold
that the giving of a mortgage transfers legal title to the mortgagee. In
North Carolina, which is within the latter class, the mortgagee is deemed
to hold the legal title in trust for the mortgagor. 13 Except for taldng
possession of the property and the institution of foreclosure proceed-
ings on default, he is permitted to do no act detrimental to his debtor's
interest.14 Thus it has been held that he may not extinguish the mort-
gagor's equity of redemption by a purchase of the security at a tax
sale,15 or at a foreclosure of either a prior encumbrance,' 6 or his own
mortgage. 17 Nor may he contract to acquire his debtor's equity of
redemption without assuming the burden of showing that the transaction
was fair.' s At least one other state that accepts the "title" theory is in
accord. 19 A different principle is advanced in those states that consider
the mortgagor as having legal title to the security, 20 although even
here it has been held that the mortgagee is a trustee.21 That doctrine
was aptly stated in a case arising in New York,22 where it was said
Taylor v. Heggie, 83 N. C. 244 (1880).
McLeod v. Bullard, 86 N. C. 210 (1882).
Cauley v. Sutton, 150 N. C. 327, 64 S. E. 3 (1909).
"Taylor v. Heggie, 83 N. C. 244 (1880).
17 Dawkins v. Patterson, 87 N. C. 384 (1882) ; Warren v. Susman, 168 N. C.
457, 84 S. E. 760 (1915).
' Pritchard v. Smith, 160 N. C. 79, 75 S. E. 803 (1912) ; Cole v. Boyd, 175
N. C. 555, 95 S. E. 77 (1918).
Stebbins v. Clendenin, 136 Ark. 391, 206 S. W. 681 (1918). Contra, Lee v.
Fox, 113 Ind. 98, 14 N. E. 889 (1888).
'Waterson v. Devoe, 18 Kan. 223 (1877) (where the mortgagee was pur-
chaser at a tax sale) ; Threlkeld v. Walker, 141 Ky. 737, 133 S. W. 772 (1911)
(where the mortgagee became assignee of a purchaser at the foreclosure of a
prior lien); Holliday v. McGraw, 101 Misc. Rep. 661, 176 N. Y. S. 661 (1919)
(where the mortgagee's agent sold part of the security on credit) ; Bailey v.
Frazier, 62 Ore. 142, 124 Pac. 643 (1912) (where creditor bought debtor's equity
of redemption) ; see Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676, 682, 28 L. ed. 565, 4 Sup.
Ct. 576, 579 (1883).
Block Motor Co. v. Melia, 247 S. W. 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
'Ten Eyck v. Craig, 62 N. Y. 406, 421 (1875) (continuing on page 422, the
court stated the principle to be this: "A mortgagee is often called a trustee, and
in a very limited sense this character may be attributed to him. There may be a
duty resting upon a mortgagee in possession to discharge a particular claim against
the land. If in such a case he omits to do it, and allows the land to be sold on
such a claim, and becomes the purchaser, he would hold the title in trust for the
mortgagor. A mortgagee in possession is allowed, and it may be his duty to pay
the taxes on the land out of the rents and profits. If he suffers the land to be
sold for taxes in violation of his duty, and purchases at the sale, he would upon
general principles be deemed to hold title as trustee. . . . A mortgagee in possession
is bound to account for rents and profits; and in that respect . . . he may be
denominated a trustee. But, except in some special sense, that is not the relation
he bears to the mortgagor."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
that "There is, in truth, no relation analogous to that of trustee and
cestui que trust between the mortgagor and mortgagee created by the
execution of the mortgage. The mortgagee is not a trustee of the legal
title because, under our law, he has no title whatever.... He may deal
with the mortgagor, in respect to the mortgaged estate, upon the same
footing as any other person; he may buy in encumbrances for less than
their face, and hold them against the mortgagor for the full amount;
he may do what any other person may do, and his acts are not subject
to impeachment simply because he is mortgagee."
It may be admitted that both parties occupy a fiduciary relationship
toward each other in the sense that each owes the duty of using reason-
able means to protect the other's interest; yet to make the unqualified
statement that one party is a trustee for the other seems to be grafting
upon the law of trusts an extension that may prove dangerous. Is it not
both safer and more accurate to say that, like principal and agent, the
mortgagor and mortgagee are bound to act fairly in respect to each other
and to the property in which they are mutually interested? If the terms
trustee and cestui que trust must be used to denote the relationship, it
should always be remembered that they are not being applied in their
technical sense.
EMMETT C. WILLis, JR.
Mortgages-Suretyship where Grantee of Mortgagor
Assumes Mortgage Debt
The maker of a bond secured by a mortgage sold the mortgaged
premises, his grantee assuming payment of the bond. Thereafter the
mortgagee dealt directly with the grantee, receiving partial payments on
the bond, and agreeing to an extension of time thereon without the
mortgagor's consent. In a suit on the bond by the mortgagee against
the mortgagor, held, as between the mortgagee and the mortgagor the
character of the latter was not changed from principal to surety by the
fact that his grantee "assumed" the mortgage. The mortgagor was
therefore not discharged by the extension of time granted without his
consent by the mortgagee to the grantee.1
Where the grantee "assumes" the mortgage debt it is generally held
that he becomes personally liable therefor.2 As a corollary to this
ICommercial National Bank of Charlotte v. Carson, 207 N. C. 495, 177 S. E.
335 (1934). This case proceeds upon the authority of Brown v. Turner, 202 N. C.
227, 162 S. E. 608 (1932), noted in (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 96.
2Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 10 Sup. Ct. 494, 33 L. ed. 667 (1889);
2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §934. This liability may be based upon either
of two theories: first, that the mortgagee is subrogated to the rights of the mort-
gagor; or second, that the mortgagee, as a third party beneficiary, may sue the
grantee directly. N. C. now allows a suit under either theory. Rector v. Lyda,
